and clarifies its relation to the propositional knowledge one might have about other persons. Section considers our knowledge of God and God's knowledge of us, and compares interpersonal knowledge with work by Eleonore Stump on "Franciscan" knowledge. Section examines how interpersonal knowledge may figure in liturgical practice, di using the problem of divine hiddenness, and motivating a novel understanding of divine love. Finally, section explores the possibility of epistemic injustice arising from dismissal or neglect of our religious testimony to one another, or of divine testimony to humanity, focusing specifically on the import of interpersonal knowledge.
Interpersonal Knowing
Knowing someone "personally" is arguably very di erent from having propositional knowledge about them, or from having qualitative knowledge of (say) what they look like, their mannerisms, mood patterns, and so on. The latter in its various forms might best be called objectual knowledge, on the model of perceiving (and retaining in memory) an object; the structure of such knowledge, however, also seems apt to knowing a city, or a a field of study. ("He knows Boston." "She knows English literature.") Yet when one knows someone personally the "object" of cognition is a subject, a person. Not only do our languages distinguish such knowledge relations either lexically or grammatically, but intuitively, knowing someone personally is not reducible to knowing a lot (propositions or qualitatively) about them.
Distinguishing between this knowledge about someone and interpersonal knowledge may be facilitated by noting three grades of personal involvement. The rst grade is achieved by having propositional knowledge of facts about a person, gained without first-hand causal interaction with the person. Such knowledge is typically gained second-hand from others: thus one can know For work on objectual knowledge, see McGrath and Schieber . E.g. in Spanish, there are saber and conocer; in German, kennen and wissen; in French, connaître and savoir. Comparable lexical distinctions are made in Polish, modern Hebrew, and Mandarin and Cantonese. In languages like English, where a single lexical item "know" can express either relation, nevertheless there are grammatical formulations which make explicit which meaning is intended. And there are syntactic rules (revealed by conjunction reduction tests, or substitution behavior) governing how each may be used. See Benton ( , -) for more.
"by description" all manner of facts about someone through, say, reading newspapers or hearing about them from friends. By contrast, the second grade of personal involvement enables one to get a bit more intimately involved with someone: one is thus involved when one gains propositional (or qualitative) knowledge about a person through perceptual access to the person, though it need not be perception of the person "in the flesh" (images of someone might su ce to learn what they look like). Such knowledge, whether qualitative or propositional, is learned first-hand, and the causal direction is one-way, from the person to the knower. Knowledge from both of these grades of involvement is plausibly knowledge-who, that is, knowledge by which one might be able to identify or individuate a person, in answer to a question about them. But notice that neither of these first two grades of involvement su ce for knowing someone personally (the relation I am also labelling "interpersonal knowledge"). A spy or a biographer might have excellent knowledge-who deriving from first or second grade personal involvement without knowing their subjects personally. Likewise, two people might have excellent knowledge of each other by working in the same institution and learning about each other from web research, or internal literature, or from the say-so of colleagues. They recognize each other's faces, they might go to the same committee meetings and hear each other o er suggestions, and so on. But if they've never addressed each other in conversation or properly met, it would seem they don't yet know each other personally. Plausibly, no amount of knowledge-who (propositional or qualitative) can bring it about that one knows another subject personally.
Interpersonal knowledge thus is not the kind of thing that can be built up out of knowing more and more propositions about someone, or by gaining more qualitative knowledge of them. And interpersonal knowledge is autonomous relative to any particular propositions known about a person, in this sense: for any set of propositions one knows about someone, one could in principle know that someone personally without knowing those particular propositions about them.
Thus there is something special about the third grade of personal involvement, which requires a kind of second-personal treatment. When both persons treat each other in this way, and each receives such treatment, the involvement is distinctively interpersonal: it requires a kind of contact with another subject where each treats the other as a subject, that is, how an "I" treats another as a particular "you". And di erently from the first two grades of knowing, when interpersonal the causal route is two-way, running both directions between subjects. Arguably these two-way interactions make up the (low-level) mindreading and resonance processes undergirding recent discoveries in cognitive science concerning simulation, mirror neurons, and joint attention, and thus these are fundamental to knowing another person secondpersonally. The required second-person stance involves each person treating the other as a subject, for example in the language of address, or in joint attention to objects or topics of conversation. Treating someone secondpersonally involves "I-you," subject-to-subject interaction, wherein some of what one learns about others is learned from, because it is given to one by, the persons themselves.
The following principle seems to capture what kinds of encounters are required for a person to know another subject personally (that is, have interpersonal knowledge of them, abbreviated as "knows i "):
E
: S knows i R only if (i) S has had reciprocal causal contact with R, in which (ii) S treats R second-personally, and (iii) R treats S second-personally.
A treatment by a subject S toward its recipient R is second-personal in virtue of S treating R as a subject (an individual "you"), where S o ers some of S's own thoughts, words, or emotions to R, and S is, or for the most part intends to be, attentive to R's thoughts, words, or emotions. Such contact between them is reciprocal insofar as each shares with the other some of their
The third grade of personal involvement is entered when one subject treats the other second-personally. But because, atypically, this treatment might be one-way by not being received, or not being reciprocated, the paradigmatic kind of third-grade involvement is interpersonal, with each treating the other as a subject.
See Goldman ( , Chaps. -, and , esp. Chaps. -) , and Stump ( , esp. Chap. ).
See Eilan ( , ) for an overview of recent work on second-personal approaches.
own thoughts, words, or emotions in response to the other. We might say that such reciprocal encounters bring the mind of the known subject itself right into the subjective life of the knower's mind, and thus their occasion for interpersonal knowing is, as our gloss has it, a state of minds meeting. We can motivate the importance of both directions of such second-personal treatment by imagining a world where all its minds are capable of thinking first-personal "I" thoughts, and third-personal "he/she/it" thoughts, but lack the ability (and language) for "you" thoughts: in such a world, intuitively, no one would count as knowing personally anyone else. Likewise, we might imagine a world where just one person has the needed second-personal ability but no one else does; plausibly that individual also fails to know others personally, because they lack the two-way reciprocal personal encounters needed to gain interpersonal knowledge.
Through personal encounters, people can progress from being mere acquaintances to being friends, to close friends, to intimates or lovers. Increase in personal encounters, once there are enough of them, makes for interpersonal knowing. Given the importance of such two-way interactions, we might be led to think that interpersonal knowledge is also symmetric:
S
: S knows i R only if R knows i S.
Given this principle, interpersonal knowledge between two subjects is lost for both if it is lost for one. S is not redundant given E , for one could fulfill the latter by having had the right kind of contact in the past, even though the person encountered no longer lives. Thus S captures a condition that mimics the factivity of propositional knowledge, according to which one can only know truths or facts: to know another interpersonally, there must be a mind there to be known.
Some may regard S and perhaps even E as too strong. Such theorists may want to allow that, while the paradigms of interpersonal knowing are indeed two-way and fulfill E , nevertheless the one-way second-personal treatment by S toward R by which S enters the third grade of involvement is necessary and sometimes su cient for S to know R personally, even though R may not know S personally (if so, then such one-way cases fail not only S , but also clauses (i) and (iii) of E ). While I find this implausible, I shall remain largely neutral on this matter here; I shall later, however, sketch some potential costs and benefits of denying at least S . For now I shall simply note that deniers of S should endorse a principle (a consequence of S ) on which a person can know another subject personally only if the person known exists. For intuitively, persons who no longer exist, or never did exist, are not interpersonally known. Understanding interpersonal knowledge as a state of minds requires the existence of both minds.
This existence requirement fits in well with skeptical concerns and deductive closure; for one might suspect that knowing another mind puts one in a very strong position concerning knowing that they exist. When thinking along these lines, it will seem that skepticism about other minds can be quite easily dispensed with. Consider the principle that propositional knowledge is closed under known entailment, (SPC): S P Necessarily, if S knows that p, competently deduces q, and C : thereby comes to believe that q, while retaining knowledge that p throughout, then S knows that q.
Knowledge that one has interpersonal knowledge will then be thought to obey the following closure principle, a simple application of SPC (where 'p' is replaced by the proposition that S knows i R): C : Necessarily, if S knows that S knows i R, competently deduces q, and thereby comes to believe that q, while retaining knowledge that S knows i R throughout, then S knows that q.
Replacing 'q' with the proposition that R exists, which is entailed by the To know human subjects, the requirement would be that they have earthly existence, such that their existence permits causal (spatio-temporal) access to them. This principle may be modified to allow for cases of the afterlife; but in the afterlife, such subjects may not plausibly count as human.
See Hawthorne ( , ) ; cf. also Dunaway and Hawthorne ( ) for more on Closure principles applied to issues concerning knowledge and God. existence requirement (or the S condition), we get an existential application of SPC: E : Necessarily, if S knows that S knows i R, competently deduces that R exists, and thereby comes to believe that R exists, while retaining knowledge that S knows i R throughout, then S knows that R exists.
Thus by C one could come to know that those whom one personally knows exist. But the skeptical threat about other minds is not so easily dismissed, because such inference by way of C only helps if one knows that one has such interpersonal knowledge; and such propositional knowledge may sometimes be hard to come by, depending on the subject in question and one's context of knowing. For example, Mary Jane knows personally Peter Parker, and thereby also knows personally Spiderman; but (at an early stage of the Spiderman story) she does not believe, and plausibly disbelieves, that she knows Spiderman personally. She might even (at that early stage) believe, falsely, that Spiderman does not exist, though of course, she knows that Peter Parker exists. Thus the state of minds that constitutes interpersonal knowing is not luminous (in Williamson's sense:
, Ch. ). What could it be to talk of interpersonal knowledge as a state of minds or a 'mental state'? Philosophers of mind and epistemologists regard as paradigms the propositional attitude mental states of belief or desire, whose logical form involves a monadic predicate: a mind is in a state having a certain kind of content. Perhaps that content can be propositional/representational or qualitative (such as feeling pain), but however the content is filled in, the logical form is that of an individual mind (named by the individual constant a) being in a state construed as bearing a property (expressed by the predicate letter F ), thus: Fa. But there are plausibly mental states that can be understood in terms of a three-place relation, as do some polyadic predicates, the form of which includes an additional constant, e.g. the dyadic relation: Fab. While some mental states may be irreducibly monadic in structure, others may take either monadic or polyadic form: Allie (a) might be (just plain) angry (Aa), though not at any particular fact or person; but she might instead be angry
) recognized this possibility.
at Blake (Aab). This latter relation is a mental state of Allie having the person Blake as object. Finally, some mental states may be irreducibly polyadic (for example, being jealous of, or being suspicious of). Since we plausibly have independent reason to recognize that mental states can be polyadic in structure and include more than one individual, we may proceed as if there are such mental states and that interpersonal knowledge is one such relation. The basic contours of interpersonal knowledge are now laid out. Most recent work in religious epistemology has attended to skepticism about theism, focusing on the rationality of believing that there is a God. Though important, we shall examine related epistemological matters which go well beyond whether one believes or knows that there is a God; our interest is what impact interpersonal knowledge can have on a host of issues in philosophy of religion. For the sake of argument, then, we shall suppose that there is a personal God something like that of the monotheistic traditions-roughly, a divine creator that is exceedingly powerful, knowledgeable, and morally good-and that it is in principle possible for one to know, interpersonally, that being as Divine subject. We shall consider precedents for this view, and then see how it might matter to divine hiddenness, liturgy, divine love, and epistemic injustice.
Interpersonal knowledge between God and us
Several philosophers and theologians have maintained that relating to God second-personally, as Divine subject, and having something like interpersonal knowledge of God, is a central aspect of religious faith. For example, Anselm engages these ideas in his most famous text: as Marilyn McCord Adams ( ) shows, in the Proslogion Anselm's genre is that of the alloquium, "in which the soul speaks to God" in the form of "second-person address to God, at intervals combining this with exclamations of thanks and praise" ( , -). Likewise Søren Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus writes:
Let us take the knowledge of God as an example. Objectively, what is reflected upon is that this is the true God; subjectively, that the individual relates himself to a something in such a way that his relation is in truth a God-relation. ... The existing person who chooses the objective way now enters upon all approximating deliberation intended to bring forth God objectively, which is not achieved in all eternity, because God is a subject and hence only for subjectivity in inwardness. ( ...the "religious" appetition... found in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas... is the coping-stone of the natural cosmos. In short, it is the appetition which seeks God as its object, or the Form of the Good, the Alone and so forth. It is the appetition directed to the highest object, to the source of all Beauty, Truth, and Goodness. ... To have such an appetition is to sin. To the writer it is sheer impiety to desire God as an object. ... To speak of God as the most beautiful object, the most satisfying object, the most desired of all objects is to sin, because one of the forms of sin, as we shall see, is to turn a personal relation into a natural relation, and to do this misdeed in relation to God is surely sin. ( ) Natural theology is helpless before the personality of God. Why? Because all knowledge of other persons is knowledge given to us by them. Personal knowledge is revealed knowledge. It comes about through communication in community. Natural objects immediately disclose their nature; but persons must consent to communicate knowledge of themselves. ( ) E.g. the Upbuilding Discourses: "This view, that to need God is a human being's highest perfection, does indeed make life more di cult, but it also views life according to its perfection, and in this view a person, through the piecemeal experience of [this need], which is the right understanding with God, comes to know God" (Kierkegaard [ -] , .). For more on Kierkegaard's use of the subjective, interpersonal stance toward God, see Cockayne . Such language is echoed by Talbert, who insists that "the other must consent to be known" ( , ).
Both Kierkegaard and Rawls tie the epistemic relation of knowing God to the propriety of relating to God as a subject in personal relations, rather than as a propositional fact. More recently, Bas van Fraassen ( , -) emphasizes similar points, while acknowledging that "for much contemporary philosophy this domain of interpersonal knowledge and interaction is simply terra incognita" (p.
):
an encounter with the divine is a personal encounter. ... An encounter with God does not involve solving a theoretical equation or answering a factual query; its searing question is an existential demand we face in fear and trembling. As with a human person, the encounter coincides with a call to decision: possible stances toward ourselves and to our world come to the fore and ask for choice (van Fraassen , ).
Related themes concerning God's giving Godself to us to be known as subject are found in Gregory of Nazianzus, Martin Buber (  [  ]) , Karl Barth, and Emil Brunner ( , esp. Chap. ), among many others. More recently, Eleonore Stump ( , ) argues that analytic philosophy of religion has fallen prey to a particularly objectifying form of inquiry "And [God] does this, it seems to me, so that to the extent that the Divine can be comprehended it may draw us to itself-for what is completely incomprehensible is also beyond hope, beyond attainment; and that to the extent that it is beyond our comprehension it might stir up our wonder, and through wonder might be yearned for all the more, and through our yearning might purify us, and in purifying us might make us like God; and when we have become this, that he might then associate with us intimately as friends-my words here are rash and daring!-uniting himself with us and making himself known to us as God to gods, perhaps to the same extent that he already knows those who are known by him." Orations . , cited in Beeley ( , -). "If God gives Himself to man to be known in the revelation of His Word through the Holy Spirit, it means that He enters into the relationship of object to man the subject. ... In His triune life as such, objectivity, and with it knowledge, is divine reality before creaturely objectivity and knowledge exist. We call this the primary objectivity of God, and distinguish it from the secondary, i.e., the objectivity which He has for us too in His revelation, in which He gives Himself to be known by us as He knows Himself." Barth, Church Dogmatics II. , (Stump , ) . Taking the original Mary case as inspiration, Stump asks us to consider a di erent Mary, who is imprisoned her whole life in a room wherein she learns all manner of facts about the world and others only through third-personal factual accounts, and without "any personal interactions of an unmediated and direct sort with another person," the kind "in which one can say 'you' to another person." Mary would, upon emerging from this room to meet her loving mother for the first time, begin to gain much qualitative, what-it-is-like knowledge of being touched and loved by another person, but also a kind of personal, Franciscan knowledge: she would begin to know her mother ( , ). This Franciscan knowledge of persons then is distinguished from other kinds of knowledge about persons, including propositional knowledge (which Stump likens to "Dominican" knowledge:
, -). Stump sometimes talks as if "the direct and immediate encounter with another human," in "face-to-face... interpersonal interactions" is crucial for gaining Franciscan knowledge of someone ( , -); but she also claims, on the same page, that "any direct causal contact between the knower and the person known" is "not necessary" to gain it ( , ). This is because Stump thinks that Franciscan knowledge of persons can be acquired primarily by way of narratives, the hearing of which constitutes a kind of second-personal engagement with the person(s) of the narrative.
However, because of these emphases, Stump is committed to the idea that one can "know" (personally, in her Franciscan sense) people who do not exist, for example, fictional characters and dead people ( , , -). Thus Stump must deny the highly plausible closure principle E , which we discussed in section . Yet these consequences seem quite counterintuitive: for how could one know someone personally, or Franciscanly, who does not exist? Is there no room for a bare ontology of persons to undergird the conditions for knowing such persons? What is more, comparing a case of S knowing personally someone who exists, with that of S knowing (in Stump's Franciscan sense) a fictional character, reveals that the former relation is both more natural and a relation of genuine epistemic interest: knowing an existing person brings a kind of cognitive connection with the social world of actual persons. Stump's di culty here extends to her idea that God may be known personally, or Franciscanly, by way of second-personal treatment. For it would seem that one could have Franciscan knowledge of God even if there is in fact there is no God. For Stump, the only thing which makes the di erence would seem to be the knower's treating some character or object as a person, as an "I" to an individual "you," even if what is so treated is not a person or there is no such thing to receive said treatment. For Stump, one of the primary ways one could engage in such treatment would be by reading or hearing the Biblical narratives in the way they demand: as narratives of a personal God's story to us and with us, through which we understand God in second-personal terms. But if there is in fact no God and such stories arise purely out of human myths, shouldn't we instead say that we do not know personally, or even Franciscanly, God? For in that case there would be no being there to be known.
This raises the question of how Stump's primary application of Franciscan
Recently Stump seems to acknowledge that there might be a problem here, at least with entirely fictional characters ( , nn. and ; cf. , n. ); but she does not consider it further.
There is evidence from cognitive science that reading narratives of speculative fiction o ers a much richer engagement (e.g. through transportation and empathy) than reading third-personal accounts (De Smedt and De Cruz ) . But my concern is epistemic, namely the question of what (or whom) one is actually brought into cognitive contact with through reading second-personal narratives.
One can get the feeling that Stump may be presupposing something like a descriptivist theory of names, according to which the characters of a narrative must refer to someone with the properties delineated in the narrative, and it is that person (even if fictional) to whom one relates second-personally and thereby knows Franciscanly. Yet such descriptivist theories have been well criticized, if not refuted, in work by Kripke ( ) and others.
knowledge, to the problem of evil, is supposed to succeed. For how does it help with the problem of evil to urge that we might know God personally, in the Franciscan sense, if one could acquire such knowledge without there being a God? One might worry that it does little to respond to the problem of evil if the knowledge supposedly relating us to God neither entails, nor even makes probable, that there is a God; this is all the more magnified for the person struggling with how the kinds and amounts of evil we find in the world make it unlikely that there is a God. By comparison, if our account of interpersonal knowledge sketched earlier is correct, it will result in a very di erent situation concerning evidence, interpersonal knowing, and the issue of skepticism about the existence of God: on our approach, knowing God interpersonally can ground one's faith in the face of evil, even su ering experienced and lived through while in relation to God.
Hiddenness, Liturgy, and Divine Love
While, as we've just seen, several philosophers suggest that knowing God through second-personal treatment of God is an important aspect of the religiously devoted theist, there are several things that can be said, and have yet to be said, about our epistemic position concerning God's existence and how we might be thought to cognize or interact with God. Here I shall sketch some new arguments and directions which interpersonal knowledge makes possible for the problem of divine hiddenness, the epistemology of liturgy, and an account of divine love.
.
Divine Hiddenness
Might it be possible to know God personally without even believing that God exists? J.L. Schellenberg ( , a, b) has answered a nearby question Perhaps if other epistemic relations remain intact: such as believing that there is a God whom one knows personally, in part because one regards one's second-personal experiences with God to have been su ciently reciprocated. But the details here can remain messy, as the discussion of divine hiddenness below reveals. in the negative, and used this denial as support for a premise in a hiddenness argument for skepticism about traditional theism.
In its most succinct form, Schellenberg's argument runs:
( ) If a loving God exists, then there are no nonculpable nonbelievers.
( ) There are nonculpable nonbelievers.
So, ( ) No loving God exists.
When spelled out more fully, his support for premise ( ) concerns a defense of sub-premises, typically along the lines of one of the following: Let us suppose, as seems highly plausible, that knowing another personally, along the lines of interpersonal knowledge discussed earlier, counts as a personal relationship of the kind Schellenberg has in mind in Not Open. Recall, however, from our discussion in section that human persons can know others personally while disbelieving, under a certain guise, that they exist. For Mary Jane can believe that Spiderman does not exist even though she knows Peter Parker personally (and believes that Parker exists). Given this much, it should be clear that Not Open, which is supposed to be a fully general principle applying to all persons and what it is for them to be open to personal relationship, is false. And since Schellenberg relies on Not Open to derive premises like ( ), his hiddenness argument clearly fails.
The above counterexample likewise calls into question passages where Schellenberg assumes that it is "impossible" to "do or experience any of the" myriad things "involved in a conscious, reciprocal relationship [with God] if she does not believe that God exists" ( a, ). To repair his argument, Schellenberg would need to supplement it in order for his principle Not Open to be plausible: he would need to o er a guise theory which spells out under what guise or description one must believe that the person with whom one is in relationship exists. Yet this kind of repair seems to be a tall order, for we noted in section that interpersonal knowing is autonomous relative to any particular propositions known (or even believed) about the person. Indeed, as has been argued elsewhere, one can know personally someone about whom one has all, or nearly all, false beliefs: e.g. a conman, who by interacting (via our third grade) with the subject he wants to exploit, will misrepresent himself in every way, thereby causing her to have entirely Indeed, it is perhaps even a stronger relation than what Schellenberg needs; but if so, the point made next will show that his principle does not hold even when assuming this stronger relation.
Cullison ( ) o ers related counterexamples where a person A can continue on in meaningful relationship with someone B, where A formerly believed B exists, but A now suspends judgment concerning B's existence (because A is not confident that B is still alive); cf. also related points by Greco ( ); Cuneo ( , ); and Stump ( , ), discovered after the present paper was completed. My example, however, is di erent because Mary Jane does not even start o believing, under the right guise, that Spiderman exists.
And articulating a general guise theory is complicated enough; see Goodman and Lederman unpub. false beliefs about his (intrinsic) properties. No doubt we will judge that she doesn't know the conman very well at all, since knowing someone well typically requires knowing some truths about someone, and of the kind that would rationally ground putting one's trust in them. But for all that, there is still someone whom she knows personally: namely, the conman (Benton , ).
Liturgical knowledge
Some have suggested that liturgically mediated experience of God can o er resources for handling concerns about divine hiddenness or at least divine silence (Rea ). Recent discussions of knowing God through liturgical practices also emphasize the importance of relating to God in a second-personal way. However, such discussions normally do not clarify whether through liturgical engagement one acquires mere perceptual contact with God, or objectual (or qualitative) knowledge of God, or practical knowledge-how to relate to God, or what we are calling interpersonal knowledge with God.
For example, some claim that liturgical acts "can be ways of experiencing the mediated presence of God" in something akin to the way that narrative commemorative events "mediate the presence of the events which they commemorate" (Rea , ) . But what epistemic relation might such mediated experience bring about? Is it like gaining qualitative knowledge of what someone looks like by seeing only a picture of them, or more like gaining a general understanding (or propositional knowledge) of someone you never met solely by hearing stories of them at their funeral? By comparison, Sarah Coakley sketches many di erent ways in which liturgical practices could have epistemic import (cf. , ), yet is content to embrace its many relations and capacities in their intertwined complexity. Terence Cuneo, for his part, argues that "knowing God" in the sense of "being in rapport with" God "is a See especially Coakley ; Cuneo , esp. Ch. ; and Wolterstor and . "...what is distinctive to liturgical 'knowing,' I have argued, is the way that bodily movement, sensual acuity, a ective longing, and noetic or intellectual response, are intricately entwined and mutually implicated in what is occurring, and indeed are being trained over time to intensify and deepen their capacity for response to the risen Christ." (Coakley , -).
species of practical knowledge" of the sort had by "knowing how to engage with God," and that such practical knowledge comes through ritualized liturgical activities: indeed, "knowing God... consists in engaging in them (Cuneo , , ) . Still others claim an order of dependence in which practical knowledge precedes perceptual ability: that ecclesial practices enable "knowhow," which itself facilitates the development of a kind of perception, that is, "a tacit perceptual knowing acquired through such mentored practices as prayer, contemplation, fasting, and mercy... a knowing how to attend to God's presence in the world." That is, "human beings, when transformed through ecclesial practices, become progressively more capable of perceiving God" (McGuigan and Kallenberg , ) . But is this mere perceptual contact? Or qualitative knowledge? Given the many possibilites invoked by just these above examples, it seems clear that philosophers of liturgy need to sort out the relations between these cognitive states and abilities, and to elaborate more fully how they are or are not gained through ritual engagement with the divine. This is not the place to attempt to provide such a satisfactory account of these many possible relations which philosophers of liturgy might have in mind. Yet if we suppose that interpersonal knowledge is the ideal relation through which God unites God's self to humans, then one proposal is to view interpersonal knowledge-being in a joint state of minds with the divine mind-as the resultant cognitive relation which can only be gained by ascending through perceptual contact to objectual knowledge, by way of our third-grade of personal involvement, which treats God second-personally as a subject, through prayer, worship, and liturgical participation; and that this stage of participation importantly involves gaining propositional knowledge, and perhaps even understanding, of the correct guises or descriptions which apply to God. If we suppose that learning how to do all of this this involves learning the practical skill of relating to God through such practices, and that cultivating such practices is part of how one learns to recognize God's responsive actions to us, we can think of liturgy as facilitating both percepIf so, this of course raises issues concerning religious diversity, particularly which descriptions of God are the correct ones, or those by which one can plausibly fix the reference of one's language for God. Unfortunately we don't have space to consider these here.
See also Sliwa ( , esp.
tual recognition and personal knowledge-how, and ultimately, interpersonal knowledge. Yet however one might attempt to sort out the details, I submit that an understanding of what knowing God through liturgy amounts to can profit by adopting the distinctions made by an epistemological account of interpersonal knowledge such as that outlined above.
Divine love
Finally, interpersonal knowledge has a role to play in motivating a novel account of divine love. Recent prominent approaches to human love diverge over whether one must have a past history of relationship with those whom one loves. I shall argue here that if one appropriates and extends any such view to divine love for human creatures, the possibility and desirability of interpersonal knowledge between God and us contributes crucial insights that are otherwise unavailable. Two early approaches di er on whether the characteristics valued by the lover in the beloved are prioritized over whom is beloved, or whether the beloved person is prioritized as the source of what the lover values in them. On the former, love consists in the lover's responding to qualities which are valued in, and perceived or believed to be had by, the beloved (the responsiveness account); whereas on a rival view, love is not thus responsive to a lover's characteristics or merits, but rather love consists in the lover's selecting one whom they will to love, and what is valued in the beloved by the lover arises out of this loving relation (the volitional account). But the responsiveness view, though it articulates the reasons why someone might love another, loses sight of the person who is loved; it would predict that we' d equally love anyone who possesses the relevant qualities, and it cannot make sense of why love is (or ought to be) constant throughout changes in someone's qualities. And the volitional view has the opposite problem of not identifying reasons for loving a particular person linked to their qualities, since the qualities valued by a lover only emerge out of the fact of being loved. Niko Kolodny's ( ) relationship theory aims to improve on these two 
Love is ... rendered normatively appropriate by the presence of a relationship. Love, moreover, partly consists in the belief that some relationship renders it appropriate, and the emotions and motivations of love are causally sustained by this belief (except in pathological cases). ( ) On this view, however, it is irrational (even if possible) to love some individuals, namely those with whom one lacks a relational history. By contrast, Kieran Setiya ( , draft) argues for a permissive account of love, on which it can be rational for any of us to love any other human being, without having any common history or past relationship with them. Setiya insists that the reasons for loving someone need not be based on their particular merits or virtues but rather, that "another's humanity is su cient reason to love them: no one is unworthy of love" ( , ). As Setiya recently qualifies this view, "it is rational to love any human being with whom you are personally acquainted, not any human being, full stop" (draft, ). For Setiya "personal acquaintance" refers to whatever cognitive contact makes possible love at first sight, and justifies concern for individuals as such. This latter kind of concern is ethically significant in that it can make it rational to give priority to helping one person instead of (say) three; this is possible, argues Setiya, in cases where you are personally acquainted with the one, but the other three are strangers. Now one might balk at attempting to adopt either such view of human love in order to illuminate an account of divine love, on the grounds that God vastly di erent from humans by being their ultimate creator and given the gulf between divine goodness and humanity's imperfection. Nevertheless, those religions which attribute to God the property of being loving, indeed being Though see Rea , Chap. , for an argument that divine love should not be identified with idealized human love. the moral exemplar of love, will need to appeal to some relevant connections insofar as it makes any sense at all to call God loving.
Many will find features of the permissive view a better fit for God's love of humanity: for not only does their humanity perhaps confer on them a special role in God's creative order, that role also justifies, given God's moral perfection, a sacrificial concern for their well-being. On a naïve, flat-footed application of the relationship view, by contrast, God would lack reasons for loving those persons with whom God does not yet have any personal relational history. Yet a more sophisticated application might insist that God at least retains, for all created persons, the crucial relation of being personal creator and sustainer of created persons; and for those theological traditions which claim that human persons are special by being created in God's likeness or image, those persons have a special personal relational history whether or not they later have the kind of interpersonal relations that make for interpersonal knowledge. So even if God lacks interpersonal knowledge of some persons, God could perhaps still be related enough to possess reasons for loving them. But on either the permissive or the relationship view, God is better positioned to love them by giving them God's very self through interpersonal knowing, once God knows them personally. Indeed, the state of minds which comprises interpersonal knowledge satisfies part of the Thomistic ideal on which the lover "desires union with the beloved": God is importantly united in a personal relation with those whom God knows personally. Those who know God personally are better positioned to recognize God's blessings or instruction as being given by God: such recognition makes possible responsive attitudes such as gratitude to God or listening for the divine voice, which in turn informs one's motivation for and commitment to a range of actions. The interpersonal knowing relation also seems to underpin the reception and function of forgiveness, which for many theistic traditions is central to divine love: if forgiveness is normatively significant in that alters the operative norms bearing on the interaction between the wronged and the wrongdoer, then the relational interactions constitutive of interpersonal knowing would play See Stump , Chaps. -. I do not suppose that my interpersonal knowledge supercedes her account of the medieval view of union with God (in her Chap. ), though as I've argued above, I think it contributes more to it than her own Franciscan knowledge.
See especially Warmke and , and Strabbing . a fundamental role. Thus even on the relationship view of love, it could be constitutive of God's love that God pursues interpersonal knowledge with all human persons; and when achieved, such knowledge will play a pivotal role in the psychology and action of the one who knows God.
Epistemic Injustice toward God and Neighbor
Interpersonal knowledge thus yields payo s for several familiar areas of philosophy of religion adumbrated above. In this final section, I shall argue that interpersonal knowledge also emerges as relevant to social epistemology in a manner as yet unappreciated, namely, given the import of epistemic injustice and the ways it may surface in religious matters. Arguably a kind of epistemic harm arises in cases where a knower's testimony is dismissed, or their credibility downgraded, due to a specific form of prejudice (see esp. Fricker , Medina , Dotson , ). Where social generalizations promote identity prejudice against certain individuals simply because they are part of a given social group, there can arise systematic imbalances in whose testimony is received as credible. This leads to patterns of injustice where individuals, due to their social identities (e.g. as women, or persons of color), are not treated as fully worth listening to, even regarding their own experiences; their stories are marginalized, reinterpreted, summarily dismissed, or otherwise treated as less credible. Such patterns involve a distinctly epistemic form of injustice, because when hearers regard such speakers as less credible than they are as a result of such prejudice, the speakers are harmed in their capacities as knowers.
Such prejudices are insidious partly because they may function as part of a culture's social imagination, and with a ective investment, without residing in an individual's beliefs about those within the social category. These are most pervasive when the prejudices which give rise to them are systematic (rather than localized), and often linked to more than one social prejudicial category; they are thus capable of causing persistent (rather than inciFor an overview, see McKinnon , as well as the more focused contributions to Kidd, Medina, and Pohlhaus . Thus such injustice can be produced even by those who do not believe the negative social stereotypes which nevertheless shape how they consume or respond to others' testimony. dental or occasional) harms. The harm involved is ethical but importantly epistemic: a speaker su ering from what Fricker calls "identity-prejudicial credibility deficit" is harmed in their "capacity as a giver of knowledge," for their testimony is not believed, or regarded as credible enough to raise significantly the hearer's confidence in what is testified to. To be prejudicially excluded in this way from the communal exchange of knowledge impugns the speaker's epistemic trustworthiness: they are e ectively treated as either incompetent or insincere (or both). But because the capacity to give knowledge to others is central to human rationality, and thereby, to an essential aspect of human value, to harm them in this capacity is to symbolically degrade someone as less than fully human (Fricker , -) . If persistent and systematic, it can also contribute detrimentally to one's loss of confidence in what one knows (thereby robbing them of particular knowledge), and in one's general abilities as a knower, even preventing them from developing intellectual virtues such as intellectual courage, impartiality, and intellectual sobriety ( , -). Such injustices can even play decisive roles in hindering vulnerable and marginalized members of such social groups from becoming the kind of person they are capable of being ( , -): they may live into the stereotyped patterns which express their diminished epistemic (and social/political) worth, acceding to related distorted images consistent with such generalizations.
Though most work on epistemic injustice has focused on the social categories of race or gender or class, religion is also a relevant social type. One could identify religious associations systematically linked with other prejudicial identity stereotypes, which could in turn suggest how religion qua social type can contribute (either positively and negatively) to a hearer's prejudicial judgment of a speaker's credibility. The central case of interest would be negative religious identity prejudice which would contribute to testimonial injustice toward speakers testifying on certain matters of religion. No doubt there could be many di erent sorts of cases. But I shall focus our attention on two kinds of harm: harm toward other human persons, even among those who share a broad religious identity; and toward God as one who speaks to us.
As noted by Fricker ( , , -). Kidd discusses epistemic injustice and religion, but does not consider the issues raised here.
For each kind, part of the epistemic harm involves the injustice of imposing a diminished capacity for gaining interpersonal knowledge.
Among fellow humans, there is the case where a religious speaker might su er credibility deficit from those who regard their testimony concerning matters linked to their religious views (whether doctrinal, moral, spiritual, etc.) to be less than credible owing to an identity prejudice centered on their specific religious identity. Such prejudice may be construed narrowly, being either inter-religious in virtue of disagreement between those of di erent religious traditions (e.g., the disagreements between Christians and Muslims); or a prejudice may even be intra-religious, such that the zealously dogmatic within a religious tradition is dismissive toward fellow adherents whom they regard as o ering mistaken views of doctrine, morality, spiritual direction, and so on. Alternatively the identity prejudice might be construed more broadly, what we might call extra-religious. This might occur when an atheist or agnostic, who is willing to disavow (nearly) any religious belief as being tainted with falsity or other epistemically dubious properties, deems the religious speaker as not due a hearing; on the other hand, it might also involve religious hearers being unwilling to take seriously a non-theist's testified objections or reservations about religion, or their testimony of their experiences living without religious commitments. The important feature is that the speaker's religious identity in one way or another provides the prejudicial hearer with their grounds for downgrading the speaker's credibility. Of course, such prejudice only harms the testifier in their capacity as a knower where the religious speaker is correct and even knows what they testify to; but we are presupposing here that there is a God and that at least sometimes, a religious individual could be correct and also know some of what they claim. Downgrading a speaker's credibility due to religious identity prejudice harms speakers who could share propositional knowledge concerning religion by testimony; and even where such speakers lack propositional knowledge, rejection of their testimony will also inhibit others from learning the more qualitative knowledge concerning what-it-is-like to practice and live from within a religious (or non-religious) perspective.
Yet whether inter-, intra-, or extra-religious in nature, cases of epistemic injustice, or even perceived injustice, can plausibly hinder people from entering into the kinds of interpersonal relations which enable one to know one another interpersonally. Because people naturally befriend and associate more with those who think like them, particularly in their social identities, these are the people whom they most often come to know personally. Though people often meet others due to sheer circumstance, even these encounters are typically guided by the structures of who knows whom; and we are more often led into circles of acquaintance by the very relations of interpersonal knowledge which are upheld for how they bind us to those with shared social identity, including religion. The intersectionality of religion with other social categories such as race or ethnicity, gender, sex, sexual orientation, or economic opportunity is relevant insofar as they contribute to how and whether people become parts of communities which cluster around such shared a liations.
The present point is that when testimonial injustice owing in part to religious di erence closes o opportunities to know others personally (or to come to know them better), this can create further systematic relational injustices across not only religious lines but also those of race, gender, sexuality, and so on. When such relational avenues are closed o , inter-religious dialogue is hindered, and intra-religious discord is exacerbated. And when this happens, extra-religious discourse between the religious and non-religious is weakened, leading to suspicion, subtle or overt insults, and accusations of closed-mindedness. Indeed, the very idiom of being "closed-minded" gains new meaning given our gloss on interpersonal knowledge: the "state of minds" which constitutes knowing another personally is unavailable to those unwilling to enter into interpersonal relationship across religious di erences.
The fragmenting of communities across intersectional identities related to religion as a result of systematic testimonial injustice is its own sort of injustice. Social discord is sewn when religious diversity and its disagreeFor important theological work on these issues with respect to race, see especially Jennings and Bantum ; for a sociological study of race and American Christianity, see Emerson and Smith . Medina makes similar points concerning the need for what he calls "epistemic interaction" ( , -).
ments foster belief polarization rather than genuine dialogue borne of humility. Where interpersonal knowledge relations are reduced or made more di cult, opportunities for and interest in cross-religious dialogue naturally diminish and eventually become widely regarded as undesirable (often, in some contexts, with oppressive and violent consequences). Since we should care about the flourishing of all in religiously diverse and (aspirationally) pluralistic societies, we should instead strive to learn from and relate to those religiously di erent from ourselves. While such e orts can represent the first steps toward mutual understanding, these steps are unlikely to be taken unless people of good will, regardless of religious identity, work toward knowing one another on relational terms in spite of, and even for the sake of, their religious di erences. Yet when such di erences are valued and embraced, this in turn promotes relations of trust across such di erences, and makes us more available for, and even interested in, knowing and understanding others well. What of God as knowing subject? Assuming a God who somehow speaks to us, in what sense could it be possible, through ignoring or rejecting divine testimony, to harm God in God's capacity as a knower? After all, God is omniscient by knowing all truths that can be known, and thus God would know everything about us (similarly, God would have all qualitative knowlege about us). And God presumably cannot be made less omniscient in these senses by our failing to hear or believe or respond to God's testimony to us. Any harm there might be would not, it seems clear, a ect God's propositional omniscience, what propositions God knows; rather, it could a ect which persons God (personally) knows.
Recall that there will be many individuals who fail to relate to God secondpersonally: this will include the many who dismiss (or are otherwise unduly skeptical of) the very possibility of God speaking to them because they insist that God does not exist. Similarly for those who may believe (intellectually) that there is a deity but who fail (or refuse) to engage in religious devotional practices of prayer or worship: insofar as these practices involving secondpersonal treatment of God are essential for one to become interpersonally acquainted with God, not participating in them results in not having treated God as a subject. These individuals will not gain testimonial knowledge of what God is communicating, but on our account of interpersonal knowledge they also, given S , can prevent God from acquiring interpersonal knowledge of themselves. In this way, they would harm God in God's own capacity to know them interpersonally; or at the very least, we may say that they thereby prevent God from knowing them interpersonally, for by being free to reject God's existence or communications, they have a role to play in permitting themselves to be known by God. As we gestured at earlier (in section . ), God's pursuit of knowing us interpersonally is arguably constitutive of divine love for us, and such interpersonal knowledge is bound up with the relational functions of divine forgiveness and its spiritual reception in terms of repentance for sin. If so, then our freedom whether to relate to God in the manner required means we are in a position to frustrate not only God's e orts to love us on relational terms, but also to impede the divine epistemic enterprise of coming to know us personally.
Some theists, however, may want to reconceive the relation of knowing personally in the divine case, such that God know us personally even if we do not know God. This alternative view would reject S at least for how God knows us. Such a position might grant that S is necessary for human interpersonal knowledge, but that God's ability to know us personally is far di erent in that God's personal knowledge of us can be one-directional, not requiring our cooperation. A theist might be driven to such a view by considerations stemming from doctrines concerning divine impassibility or divine aseity; or perhaps such a theist regards divine knowledge of any kind to be una ected by anything which a human person might do or fail to do. In particular, one might conceive of the sort of epistemic injustice or oppression sketched earlier to be possible only where the harmed knower stands in a subjugated position given the power relations between the would-be hearer Significant questions arise for strong sovereignty theologies, such as Reformed views descending from Calvin or Edwards, on which people are not significantly free (e.g., in the incompatibilist sense) in any of their decisions. For if some are not free to refrain from treating God second-personally, and others are not free to do so, it is more di cult to conceive of the two-way second personal interactions described in E as being reciprocal in the relevant sense. However, I do not have space to consider these issues at length here. and the testifying knower. But in the divine case, a theist might on theological grounds reject that a human could ever stand in the requisite position of (epistemic) power over God.
Whatever the rationale, note that even on a rival view of knowing personally that abandons S at least for divine knowledge of us, E itself o ers grounds for denying that God knows personally many who fail to respond in second-personal terms to God's testimonial communication to us. For in not responding, the contact between such persons and God is not reciprocal, thus failing E 's clause (i) on which the causal contact must be reciprocal; and it would also fail E 's clause (iii), which requires the known person to treat the knower second-personally.
Thus such a revision of what interpersonal knowledge amounts to in the divine case toward us will stand in need of elaborate recasting in order to articulate alternative principles which provide an account of how God knows us; for neither S nor E as stated will suit the needs of such an alternative account. Even if developing such an account may be accomplished to this theist's satisfaction, it will remain the case that the sort of interpersonal knowledge commonly had between humans is something which God does not have with many human persons. Yet if an alternative theistic account of divine knowledge of persons nevertheless makes room for the idea that between humans our interpersonal knowing amounts to a genuine epistemic relation, such an account will have to concede that it is an epistemic relation which God can lack, and has lacked, toward some individuals.
Conclusion
Interpersonal knowledge has not been given nearly the attention that other ideas in epistemology have received, and this even as social epistemology has recently blossomed. Yet the time seems ripe to explore it in its own right, and Some might balk at using the label of epistemic injustice here, on the grounds that we cannot be unjust toward God (perhaps, at most, we can be impious toward God); if so, perhaps this should be called "epistemic impiety." Whatever labels one prefers, the idea sketched above is, I hope, clear enough to grasp. (Thanks to Christina Van Dyke here.) to assess how relevant it can be to a range of issues in epistemology, the epistemology of religion, philosophy of religion, and analytic theology. Arguably, interpersonal knowledge can also enhance several Christian theological doctrines which we have not been able to consider: for example, the doctrine of ine ability (see Keller forthcoming), the indwelling of the Holy Spirit (see Alston ), the Eastern Orthodox conception of theosis (see Jacobs ), or the social conception of the Trinity.
I have argued here for developing the contours of some recent approaches to knowing others interpersonally, and have suggested the significant impacts it can have on skepticism from divine hiddenness, the epistemology of liturgy, understanding divine love, and for newer issues of epistemic injustice toward God and neighbor. Though these treatments have needed to be somewhat cursory, they lay the foundation for re-envisioning issues at the intersection of epistemology and religion.
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A quick sketch: one can say that the joint state of mind had between the Father and Son, or the Spirit and Father, or the Son and Spirit, constitute the shared (mental) state understood mereologically, in terms of mutual parthood, which o ers a coherent model of their mutual indwelling (see Cotnoir for such a mutual parthood account). On such an approach, the divine persons indwell one another by sharing a joint mental state of interpersonal knowledge, where this state is a part mutually had in virtue of their mereological relations to one another. In Cotnoir's terminology, "every person [of the Trinity] is a mutual part of every other person of the Trinity" ( , ). I develop some of these ideas in other work.
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